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2491 CASE NOTES 249 
Federal Income Taxation -DEDUCTIBILITY OF CONSTRU CTION-RELATED 
DEPRECIATION -Comrnzsszoner v. Idaho Power Co., 94 S. Ct. 2757 
(1 974). 
The taxpayer, Idaho Power Co., is a public utility engaged in the pro- 
duction, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity. During 1962 
and 1963 the taxpayer used certain transportation equipment that it 
owned to construct capital improvements. On its books, the taxpayer 
capitalized the portion of the depreciation on its equipment that related 
to such construction, as required by the Federal Power Commission.l 
For income tax purposes, however, the taxpayer deducted depreciation 
on the construction-related equipment over the depreciable life of the 
equipment, in reliance upon section 167(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954.2 The Commissioner disallowed the deduction, princi- 
pally on the grounds that, pursuant to section 263(a), depreciation on 
such equipment is a nondeductible capital expendi ture.3 The Tax 
Court upheld the Commissioner's determination,4 but the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that depreciation is specifically 
deductible under section 167(a) and is not "an amount paid out" within 
the meaning of section 263(a).5 The United States Supreme Court 
reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, holding that depreciation on 
equipment used to construct capital improvements must be capitalized 
and deducted over the depreciable lives of the capital  improvement^.^ 
In so holding, the Court announced that depreciation is within the 
scope of section 263(a), and that sections 161 and 261 indicate that 
section 263 takes precedence over section 1 67 (a). 
A. The  Internal Revenue Code 
The two sections commonly used in determining the tax treatment of 
construction-related depreciation are section 167 in part VI and section 
263 in part IX. Section 167 allows a depreciation deduction for exhaus- 
lFPC Reg., 18 C.F.R. 293-94 (1974). 
The Idaho Public Utilities Commission has adopted these procedures and also requires the 
taxpayer to capitalize construction-related depreciation. See 10 IDAHO CODE ANN. 9s 61-523, 
24 (1947). 
2All references in the text to "section" or "sections," unless otherwise indicated, refer to the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended. 
3The Commissioner also asserted that section 167(a) does not apply to construction-related 
depreciation because the taxpayer was not in the "trade or business" of constructing its own 
assets. See note 1 1 infra. 
4Idaho Power Co., 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 383 (1970), rev'd, 477 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1973), 
rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 2757 (1974). 
5Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 2757 (1974). 
GCommissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 94 S. Ct. 2757 (1974). 
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tion, wear, and tear of property used in the trade or business.' In 
contrast, section 263 disallows deductions for any "amount paid out" for 
capital impro~ements.~ The terms "trade or business" and "amount 
paid out" are not defined in the Code. Nevertheless, the commissioner 
has contended that most taxpayers who claim depreciation on equipment 
used to construct capital improvements do not qualify for section 167 
treatment because they are not engaged in the "trade or business" of 
constructing capital improvements.9 Furthermore, the Commissioner 
has contended that depreciation is an "amount paid out" within the 
meaning of section 263.l0 
Courts have usually accepted the Commissioner's argument that most 
taxpayers are not in the "trade or business" of constructing their own 
capital improvements.ll In the instant case, however, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected this argument, implying that all activities that are appropriate 
to a taxpayer's principal business are part of its "trade or business" 
under section 167.12 The Commissioner conceded this issue on 
7 1 ~ ~ .  REV.CODE OF 1954,$ 167(a). 
There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaus- 
tion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) - 
(1) of property used in the trade or business. . . . 
~ I N T .  REV. CODE OF 1954,s 263(a). 
No deduction shall be allowed for - 
(1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or better- 
ments made to increase the value of any property or estate. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
9Rev. Rul. 59-380, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 87,88 (1959). 
[TI he building equipment used in the construction cannot be considered as property 
used in the regular trade or business of the taxpayer. . . Depreciation sustained on con- 
struction equipment owned by a taxpayer and used on the erection of capital improve- 
ments for its own use is not an allowable deduction . . . . 
"The Commissioner's position is based on Treas. Reg. 5 1.263(a)-2(a) (1958) which states: 
The  following paragraphs of this section include examples of capital expenditures: 
(a) The cost of acquisition, construction or erection of buildings, machinery and equip- 
ment, furniture and fixtures, and similar property having a useful life substantially be- 
yond the taxable year. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
"In Great Northern Ry., 30 B.T.A. 691 (1934), a depreciation deduction on equipment 
used in self-construction of capital assets was allowed because the equipment was used in a 
trade or business of the taxpayer. This view apparently prevailed until 1959 when the IRS 
ruled that equipment used in self-construction must be used in the taxpayer's regular trade or 
business in order for related depreciation to be deductible. T h e  Court of Claims followed this 
test in Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222, 1264-69 (Ct. C1. 1969) in 
denying a depreciation deduction because the equipment used in self-construction was not 
used in the trade or business. The court of appeals in the instant case disagreed with the 1959 
IRS ruling and allowed a deduction for depreciation taken on equipment used in self- 
construction of capital improvements. The court emphasized the continuity and regularity of 
the taxpayer's construction activities, thereby inferring a "trade or business" must consist of 
more than occasional self-construction activities. See cases cited at Commissioner v. Idaho 
Power Co., 94 S. Ct. 2757,2762 n.5. 
12477 F.2d at 696. 
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appeal to the Supreme CourtF 
Most courts have also accepted the Commissioner's position that 
construction-related depreciation is an "amount paid out" within the 
meaning of section 263(a). In L. W. Brooks, Jr.,14 for example, the Tax 
Court concluded that in the cost of producing income, depreciation is 
as much an "expenditure" as the cost of labor or other items of direct cost. 
Nevertheless, in construing other Code sections where similar language 
is employed, courts have indicated that depreciation is not "paid out." 
For example, section 170(a)(l) allows a charitable deduction for any 
charitable contribution "payment of which is made within the taxable 
year." In Orr v .  United States, the Fifth Circuit held that depreciation 
is not a "payment" because no transfer of money or property occurs.l5 
Section 2 1 3(a)(l) allows, under certain conditions, a deduction for 
"expenses paid" for medical care and insurance premiums. In Maurice 
S. Gordon,16 the Tax Court reasoned that depreciation is not an "ex- 
pense paid" within the plain meaning of that term, but a decrease in 
value. 
The Court of Claims followed the Commissioner's interpretation of 
"trade or business" in Southern Natural Gas Co. v .  United States.17 In  
that case, the taxpayer used its automotive equipment in constructing 
additions to pipeline facilities. The Court of Claims held that the tax- 
payer was not in the "trade or business" of constructing pipelines and 
that the term "amount paid out" included depreciation sustained on 
construction-related equipment. The Tax Court in the instant case 
followed Southern Natural Gas in reasoning that the taxpayer was not in 
the "trade or business" of constructing its own capital improvements. 
The Tax Court also accepted the reasoning in L. W. Brooks, Jr., that 
depreciation is an "expenditure" and, by equating "expenditure" with 
"amount paid out, " required the taxpayer to capitalize its construction- 
related depreciation. However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the 
Tax Court and, based upon Orr and Gordon, concluded that deprecia- 
tion is not "an amount paid out" within the plain meaning of the term, 
but is a "decrease in value. "18 
The pertinent sections of the Code are contained in parts VI and IX, 
subchapter B, chapter 1, subtitle A. Part VI commences with section 
161,lg which states that the items specified in part VI are subject to the 
1394 S. Ct. at 2762 n.5. 
'450 T.C. 927 (1968), reu'd on other grounds, 424 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1970). 
l50rr V. United States, 343 F.2d 533, 556 (5th Cir. 1965); accord, Clinton H. Mitchell, 42 
T.C. 953, 973 (1964). See also Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 96 (1960). 
'637 T.C. 986 (1962). 
I7412 F.2d 1222, 1264459 (Ct. C1. 1969). 
'8477 F.2d at 694-95. 
1 9 1 ~ ~ .  &v. CODE OF 1954,s 161. 
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exceptions provided in part IX. Part IX commences with section 26 1, 
which provides that no deduction is allowed in respect to the items 
specified in part IX.20 However, until the instant case, sections 161 and 
261 have not been construed as establishing the priority of part IX over 
part VI. On the contrary, sections 161 and 261 were viewed as simple 
references between separate parts of the Code. 
Mertens indicates that section 16 1 : 
[Hlas no independent substantive impact. Under it, statutory per- 
mission is granted for the deduction of the specific items indicated in Part 
VI of Subchapter B. As is evident, this provision is largely a mechanical 
drafting device making certain that there is legal authority for the allow- 
able deductions indicated.21 
According to Mertens, section 261 has a similar purpose: 
As a mechanical drafting matter having no independent substantive 
impact, Section 261 disallows a deduction from gross income for those 
items specified in Part IX of Subchapter B of the 1954 Code. This section 
corresponds to Section 24(a) of the 1939 Code.22 
B. Code Treatment of Similar Items 
Other construction-related expenses are treated in a variety of ways, 
either by express Code provision or by administrative and judicial in- 
terpretation. For example, the costs of labor, materials, and tools are 
required to be capitalized and depreciated over the life of the constructed 
asset. On the other hand, interesc23 losses,24 sales and use ta~es ,~5  and 
pension plan contributions26 are all deductible in the year actually 
incurred. Certain taxes and other carrying charges may be capitalized 
or currently deducted at the taxpayer's option.27 Research and experi- 
-- - -- 
In  computing taxable income.. . there shall be allowed as deductions the items specified 
in this part, subject to the exceptions provided in part IX (sec. 261 and following, relating 
to items not deductible). 
2 0 1 ~ ~ .  &v. CODE OF 1954,s 261. 
In computing taxable income no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of the 
items specified in this part. 
21J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, CODE COMMENTARY 5 161 (Malone ed. 1973). 
22Zd. 8 261. 
231~r .  h v .  CODE OF 1954, 9 165; see INT. kv. CODE OF 1954, 9 266 (interest as a carrying 
charge may be deducted or capitalized at the taxpayer's option); Rev. Rul. 70-88, 1970-1 
CUM. BULL. 32 (interest during construction deductible even though capitalized on taxpayer's 
books as required by federal regulatory agency). 
2 4 1 ~ ~ .  %v  CODE OF 1954, 9 165; see All-Steel Equipment, Inc., 54 T.C. 1749, 1759 (1970), 
rev'd in part, 467 F.2d 1184 (7th Cir. 1972). 
2 5 1 ~ ~ .  &v  CODE OF 1954, § 164; see INT. h v .  CODE OF 1954, § 266 (sales and use taxes as 
carrying charges may be deducted or capitalized at the taxpayer's option). 
2 6 1 ~ ~ .  REV. CODE OF 1954,s 404; see I. T. 3408, 1940-2 CUM. BULL. 17 8 (1 940). 
2 7 1 ~ ~ .  &v. CODE OF 1954,s 266. 
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mentation expenses28 are among a group of items specifically exempted 
from capitalization by section 263 .29 
C. Accounting Theory 
In an effort to determine the scope of the depreciation deduction, the 
Supreme Court has espoused two ostensibly differing theories of de- 
preciation. The "replacement theory," which the Ninth Circuit stressed 
in the instant case,30 originated in the early case of Knoxville v. Knox- 
ville Water c 0 . 3 ~  where the Supreme Court emphasized the role of 
depreciation in providing a sufficient sum out of earnings for replace- 
ment of a consumed or obsolete asset. In Hertz Corp. v .  United State~,3~ 
however, the Supreme Court formulated a "benefit theory" which em- 
phasizes the allocation of the expense of using an asset to the various 
periods "benefited" by that asset. 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (A1 CPA) 
defined depreciation accounting in Accounting Terminology Bulletin 
No. 1 as a system of accounting which aims to distribute the cost of 
tangible capital assets over the estimated useful life of the unit in a 
systematic and rational manner.33 The AICPA, however, has never 
dealt specifically with construction-related depreciation. Accountants 
agree that direct costs, such as materials and labor, incurred in con- 
struction of a capital asset should be capitalized, but they disagree on the 
propriety of capitalizing overhead costs, including depreciation, that 
relate to construction a~tivities.3~ 
The Federal Power Commission establishes utility rates based upon a 
utility's "net investment" in plant and facilities. T o  arrive at "net in- 
2 8 1 ~ ~ .  REV. CODE OF 1954, $ 174. 
~ ~ I N T .  REV. CODE OF 1954, $5 174 (research and experimentation expenses), 175 (soil and 
conservation expenses), 180 (expenses for fertilizer etc.), 182 (expenditures by farmers for 
clearing land), 616 (expenditures for the development of mines or deposits). 
30477 F.2d at 690-91. 
3l212 U.S. 1, 13 (1909). 
[A] company is entitled to earn a sufficient sum annually to provide not only for current 
repairs, but for making good the depreciation and replacing the parts of the property 
when they come to the end of their life. The company is not bound to see its property 
gradually waste, without making provision out of earnings for its replacement. 
See Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98, 101 (1943); Idaho Power Co. v. Com- 
missioner, 477 F.2d 688, 691 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 2757 (1974). See also Treas. Reg. 
9 1.167(a)-l(a) (1972). 
32364 U.S. 122, 126 (1960). 
332 APB ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES, ACCOUNTING TERMINOLOGY BULLETIN O. 1 - REVIEW 
AND RESUME 7 56, at 9513 (1973). 
34G. JOHNSON 8C J. GENTRY, FINNEY AND MILLER'S PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING -INTERMEDI- 
ATE 381 (7th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as FINNEY AND MILLER] ; W. MEIGS, A. MOSICH, C. 
JOHNSON, & T.  KELLER, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 368 (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 
MEICS] . 
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vestment," the FPC has developed a Uniform System of Accounts 
that specifies which items must be capitalized and included in the 
capital asset accounts.35 This practice assures the utilities under the 
FPC's control a fair return on invested capital based upon uniformly 
applied standards.36 The FPC's Uniform System of Accounts requ 
all utilities to capitalize construction-related depreciation.37 
11. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION 
In beginning its analysis, the Supreme Court announced that 
res 
its 
"primary concern'' was to "treat construction-related depreciation in a 
manner which comports with accounting and taxation realities."38 The 
Court reasoned that depreciation represents the cost of physical con- 
sumption39 of a capital asset and that a depreciation deduction represents 
an attempt to allocate the expense of using an asset to the various periods 
benefited by that asset. Based upon these premises, the Court reasoned 
that construction-related depreciation benefits the entire period of the 
constructed asset's useful life and should be capitalized over that period. 
The  Court contrasted its "benefit theory" of depreciation with the 
"replacement theory" adopted by the Ninth Circuit in the instant case. 
According to the Court, replacement was rejected as the "strict and sole 
purpose of depre~ia t ion"~~ in United States v .  Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.4l 
Additionally, the Court said that if replacement is the dominant purpose 
of depreciation, the asset to be replaced is the constructed improvement, 
not the equipment used to build it. 
T o  bolster its reasoning, the Court pointed out that other construction- 
related expenses such as the costs of tools, materials, and labor are in- 
cluded in the cost of a constructed facility rather than deducted in the 
year of actual payment. The Court reasoned that construction-related 
depreciation, like these direct costs, is finally disposed of in the con- 
structed capital asset. Further, the Court reasoned, requiring the tax- 
payer to depreciate the equipment over the longer life of the constructed 
improvements prevents the distortion of income and maintains tax parity 
between a taxpayer that constructs its own capital facilities and a tax- 
payer that does not. 
3516 U.S.C. $5 796(13), 797(b), 813,825(a), (c) (1960). 
36See Alabama Power Co. v. FPC, 134 F.2d 602,609 (5th Cir. 1943). 
3'FPC Reg., 18 C.F.R. 293-94 (1974). 
3894 S. Ct. at 2763. 
39But see 4 J .  MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION $8 23.38-.42 (Malone ed. 1973). Physical 
consumption is but one cause of depreciation, others include economic changes, the normal 
progress of the art, invention and other current developments, local conditions peculiar to the 
taxpayer and trade or business, and taxpayer's policy as to repairs, renewals, and replacements. 
4O94 S. Ct. at 2764. 
41412 U.S. 401,415 (1973). 
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The Court also noted that federal and state regulatory agencies re- 
quire the taxpayer to use accounting procedures that capitalize con- 
struction-related deprec ia t i~n .~~ The Court conceded that in determin- 
ing tax questions, little attention, if any, is ordinarily given to com- 
pulsory agency practice~,~3 but the Court relied upon section 446 which 
states: "Taxable income shall be computed under the method of ac- 
counting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his in- 
come in keeping his books" unless the method "does not clearly reflect 
income."44 The Court concluded that if the agency accounting practice 
clearly reflects income, it is "almost presumptively controlling of federal 
income tax consequences. "45 
After focusing on accounting theory and regulatory practices, the 
Court analyzed the pertinent sections of the Internal Revenue Code. 
The Court acknowledged that a literal application of section 167 would 
allow the depreciation deduction.46 Hence, the critical issue was whether 
section 263, requiring capitalization, also applied, and if it did, how the 
conflict between the two sections should be resolved. The Court held 
that section 263(a) does apply to construction-related depreciation, 
thereby rejecting two of the taxpayer's contentions previously accepted 
by the court of appeals. In doing so, the Court asserted that depreciation 
is an "amount paid out" within the meaning of section 263(a), and noted 
that the regulations indicate "amounts paid out" include costs of 
acquisition.47 The Court considered the regulation as an administrative 
understanding that "amount paid out" is equivalent in meaning to 
"cost incurred. " By adopting this construction, the Court reasoned that 
depreciation is "paid out" in the same sense as are amounts expended for 
materials and labor. Moreover, the Court announced that certain de- 
cisions48 construing sections 170 and 2 1 3, which indicate depreciation is 
not an "amount paid out," are irrele~ant.~S 
The Court resolved the conflict between section 167(a) which requires 
deduction and section 263(a) which requires capitalization by holding 
that section 263(a) takes priority over section 167(a) when the literal 
requirements of each are fulfilled. The Court also stated that the word- 
ing of section 161, "subject to the exceptions provided in Part IX," 
42See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text. 
43See Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552,562 (1932). 
441~r .  REV. CODE OF 1954,s 446. 
4594 S. Ct. at 2766. 
4694 S. Ct. at 2762 n.5. 
47See note 10 supra. 
48See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text. 
4994 S. Ct. at 2766 n.11. The Court said that these cases concerned the timing of an expendi- 
ture and have no relevance to rhe issuc: of capitalization. 
256 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1975: 
indicates that any section in part IX takes precedence over any section in 
part VI.50 
Finally, the Court recognized the congressional intent involved in the 
1954 Code to provide for liberalization of depreciation, but rejected the 
applicability of that intent to this case because, (1) the liberalization was 
intended to take place without departing from realistic standards of 
depreciation accounting, and (2) the changes relate primarily to compu- 
tation of depreciation and, thereby, do not affect section 167(a) and 
section 263(a).51 
Throughout the opinion, the Court focused upon the purpose of 
depreciation. The Code, however, evidences no congressional intent to 
adopt a specific theory of depreciation. Hence, accounting theory should 
only determine the tax treatment of construction-related depreciation to 
the extent that a taxpayer adopts a particular theory in reporting his in- 
come.s2 Whereas the Ninth Circuit emphasized the "replacement 
theory" of depreciation which supports its interpretation of the appli- 
cable Code sectionsY53 the Supreme Court adopted the "benefit theory" 
and announced that the purpose of depreciation is to "allocate the 
expense of using an asset to the various periods which are benefited by 
that asset "54 (emphasis added). 
The Court cited a passage in United  States v .  Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.55 
as rejecting the "replacement theory."56 When taken in context, how- 
ever, the quoted passage does not reject the "replacement theory." The 
5094 S. Ct. at 2767. 
51Justice Douglas believes the Supreme Court is particularly ill equipped to decide tax 
disputes because of the increasingly complex and technical nature of tax law and the inex- 
perience of the Court in such matters due to its infrequent exposure to them. Nevertheless, 
Justice Douglas agrees with the Ninth Circuit and would affirm its determination. 
52See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,s 446. 
(a) General Kule. -Taxable income shall be computed under the method of account- 
ing on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his 
books. 
53The "replacement theory" emphasizes cost recovery over the life of a depreciable asset to 
allow for replacement of each asset when it is fully depreciated. Thus, even if the deprecia- 
tion on the equipment used for construction benefits future periods cost recovery over the 
longer life of the constructed improvements would be insufficient to replace the equipment 
when it was depreciated. The  Supreme Court's "benefit theory," on the other hand, requires 
cost recovery over the life of the constructed improvements because the construction-related 
depreciation "benefits" periods beyond its useful life. 
5494 S. Ct. at  2763. 
5%12 U.S. 401,415 (1973). 
Whatever may be the desirability of creating a depreciation reserve under these circum- 
stances, as a matter of good business and accounting practice, the answer is .  . . "Deprecia- 
tion reflects the cost of an existing capital asset, not the cost of a potential replacement." 
Id.  (citations omitted). 
j694 S. Ct. at 2764. 
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taxpayer in that case sought to depreciate equipment paid for by a 
government subsidy, which required the taxpayer to replace the equip- 
ment as it became obsolete or worn out. The quoted passage merely 
points out that sound accounting principles allow only depreciation of 
the cost of an asset and not its potential replacement. Therefore, even 
though the taxpayer was required to replace the asset, in the absence of 
a cost, no depreciation was allowed.57 
Neither the "replacement theory" nor the "benefit theory, " when 
taken out of context, completely states the purpose of depreciation. 
Each theory has been derived from passages in Supreme Court cases 
dealing with specific depreciation problems, but none of these passages 
purported to be a complete explanation of depreciation. Both theories 
recognize that depreciation is based on cost recovery allocated rationally 
over the asset's useful life,58 but the crucial question is, what is a rational 
allocation in a given situation? Inasmuch as every capital asset used in 
construction is "consumed" and also "benefits" future periods, neither 
theory furnishes a practitioner with the analytical tools necessary to 
decide whether and to what extent depreciation must be capitalized. 
T o  bolster its application of the "benefit theory," the Court relied on 
the fact that other construction-related expenses, such as the cost of labor 
and materials, must be capitalized. The Court asserted that depreciation 
on construction equipment, like these direct costs, is assimilated into 
the cost of the capital asset constructed. In  a strict sense, however, 
depreciation on automotive equipment is not "assimilated" into the 
cost of a constructed building as are the construction materials that 
actually become part of the building or the cost of labor incurred directly 
in construction. The concept that depreciation is like a direct cost ap- 
parently is based on the Court's assertion that depreciation will benefit 
future periods.59 But the Court's reference to the treatment of other 
construction-related items is misplaced, for a strict application of the 
"benefit theory" would require capitalization of many items that are 
currently deductible because every cost, expenditure, or diminution in 
value incurred during construction "benefits" future periods to some 
degree. Thus, the "benefit test" for capitalization will be difficult to 
apply because the Court did not indicate how much a cost must benefit 
a future period to necessitate capitalization. 
- ---- - - - 
57See Parsons v. United States, 227 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1955). 
Finally, it may be noted that this is one of the many situations in which the annual 
allowance for depreciation may not aggregate the replacement value of the business 
property. But if this is viewed as harsh or objectionable, the vice is inherent in the fact 
that the present statutory scheme of depreciation allowances is based upon cost rather 
than replacement value. 
5*See Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 96 (1960); 2 APB ACCOUNTING 
PRINCIPLES, s u p ~ a  note 33. 
j994 S. Ct. at 2765. 
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A.  Accounting Theory 
Although accounting theory does not determine the tax treatment of 
construction-related depreciation, it furnishes a more sophisticated 
analysis then either the "benefit" or "replacement" theory. Accountants 
do not classify depreciation as a direct cost, but as an item of overhead.60 
Accountants agree that the cost of a self-constructed capital asset includes 
the cost of material and labor, but disagree on how much overhead, if 
any, should be ~api ta l ized .~~ 
A small number of accountants believe that no overhead should be 
allocated to the cost of a self-constructed capital asset.62 This approach 
results in no depreciation being capitalized. A few accountants favor a 
second method which would capitalize a portion of all expenses in- 
cluding administrative expenses such as officers' ~alaries.~3 The third 
theory, which has substantial support among accountants, requires 
capitalization of a portion of all overhead items related to self-construc- 
tion, including fixed expenses, in the same ratio as they are normally 
charged to  operation^.^^ The proponents of this approach argue that no 
special cost exemptions should be granted and assert that this approach 
avoids undercosting self-constructed capital assets.65 This approach 
capitalizes a portion of construction-related expenses such as taxes, in- 
terest, power, pension plan contributions, and depreciation. Finally, 
many accountants believe that only overhead that would not be incurred 
in the absence of the construction activity should be capitalized.66 The 
supporters of this "incremental overhead approach" assert that some 
additional costs will necessarily be incurred during self-construction. 
Thus, although many fixed expenses would remain the same, other 
expenses would vary almost proportionately with the amount of con- 
s t r ~ c t i o n . ~ ~  The "incremental overhead approach" capitalizes "extra" 
depreciation. Depreciation on an asset that is acquired for use in normal 
operations and is used in construction when it would otherwise be idle 
' ~ ~ F I N N E Y  AND ~'IILLER 32; A. MATZ, 0. CURRY, COST ACCOUNTING - PLANNING AND CONTROL 
258 (5th ed. 1972). 
6 1 F ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  AND MILLER 382; MEIGS 412; H. SIMMONS 8: W. KARENBROCK, INTERMEDIATE 
ACCOUNTING 41 3 (4th ed. 1964). 
6 * i \ i I ~ ~ ~ s  412. 
6 3 F ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  AND MILLER 382. The "benefit theory," if carried to its extreme, would require a 
portion of all costs to be capitalized. 
'j4FlNNEy AND MILLER 381; MEIGS 412; H. SIMONS & W. KARENBROCK, S U ~ T U  note 61, at 414. 
See C. HORNGREN: COST ACCOUNTING: A MANAGERIAL EMPHASIS 413-17 (3d ed. 1972). Over- 
head rates are ordinarily developed by dividing estimated total overhead by estimated total 
direct-labor hours or estimated total machine hours. 
'j5See note 64 supra. 
6 6 F ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  AND MILLER 381; MEIGS 412; A. HOLMES, G. MAYNARD, J. EDWARDS, & R. MEIER, 
INTERMEDIATE CCOUNTING 365 (Sd ed. 1958). 
6 7 F 1 ~ ~ ~ ~  AND 'IILLER 381. 
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is not capitalized. On the other hand, depreciation on special tools or 
machinery used in self-construction becomes a part of the cost of the 
constructed asset. 
B. Agency-Imposed Compulsory Accounting Practices 
The Federal Power Commission and the Idaho Public Utilities 
Commission both require the taxpayer to capitalize construction-related 
depreciation. The Court announced, in an unprecedented move, that if 
the practices imposed by these agencies clearly reflect income, they are 
"almost presumptively controlling of federal income tax conse- 
quences."68 This statement contradicts the Supreme Court's assertion 
in Old Colony R.R. v .  Commissioner that administrative accounting 
procedures are made for purposes other than the determination of tax 
liability under the revenue acts, and hence should not be used to deter- 
mine tax liability.69 
The objectives of the FPC in promulgating accounting procedures 
are not the same as those of Congress in passing revenue acts. The FPC 
formulates regulations to aid in its rate-making function. T o  provide 
equitable rates to all utilities, a constant ascertainable standard is vital. 
The FPC, therefore, specifically lists all expenses which are to be capi- 
talized by the utilities it controls. Under this rationale many items which 
are currently deductible under the Code are required to be capitalized, 
such as payroll taxes, property taxes, interest, law expenses, insurance, 
relief and pension expenses, and earnings and expenses during con- 
str~ction.~O 
C. Section 263(a) 
The court of appeals held that section 263(a) does not apply in the 
instant case because depreciation is not an "amount paid out" within the 
meaning of that section. Section 263(a) itself does not define "amount 
paid out, " but the regulations indicate that "amounts paid out" include 
the "cost of acquisition, construction or erection of  building^."^^ The  
Supreme Court interpreted this regulation as an "administrative under- 
standing" that "amount paid out" equates with "cost incurred," and 
concluded that depreciation is a "cost incurred."72 
"94 S. Ct. at 2766 (dictum). 
6901d Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 562 (1932); accord, Kansas City S. Ry. v. 
Commissioner, 52 F.2d 372, 377-78 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 676 (1931); Barretville 
Bank & Trust Co., 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 749 (1958); cJ: Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & 
Loan Assn., 403 U.S. 345, 355-56 (1971). 
?OFPC Reg., 18 C.F.R. 240-42 (1974). 
?lSee note 10 supra. 
'294 S. Ct. at 2766. 
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This conclusion is unsettling for several reasons. First, there is no 
specific language in the applicable regulation which indicates the phrase 
"cost of acquisition, construction or erection" was intended to include 
construction-related depreciation. The "cost of acquisition, construction 
or erection" is listed as an "example" of section 263(a),73 but the word 
"cost" is not defined. It is unreasonable to attribute a broad meaning to 
"cost," which is used only as an example of an "amount paid out." If 
depreciation is not "an amount paid out" within the meaning of section 
263(a), it is a fortiori not a "cost" within the meaning of the regulation. 
A regulation cannot expand the scope of a Code section.74 
Second, if section 263(a) now extends to all "costs" of construction, the 
future deductibility of other construction-related expenses is placed in 
doubt. In a broad sense, interest, taxes, contributions to pension plans, 
and losses are all "costs" of construction. 
Third, the Court's apparent rejection of the plain meaning of the term 
"amount paid out" creates confusion in that the wording of the Code 
section cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, the decision creates an 
inconsistency in language between sections of the Code inasmuch as 
similarly worded sections indicate that depreciation is not a "payment" 
or "expense paid."75 Finally, the Court has, in construing section 167 
in other contexts, indicated depreciation is not "paid out. "76 Moreover, 
the Supreme Court has stated that Congress recognizes depreciation as a 
legitimate expense even though it is a "decrease in value."77 
D. Sections I61 and 261 
Section 16 1 has not been mentioned in past decisions dealing with 
construction-related depreciation.?g Courts have viewed section 16 1 as 
primarily a mechanical drafting device.79 The Commissioner char- 
73See note 10 supra. 
74See Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas. Co. v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 98, 102 (8th Cir. 1953). 
75See Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965); Maurice S. Gordon, 37 T.C. 986 
(1962). 
76Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 96 (1960); see United States v. Ludey, 
274 U.S. 295, 300 (1927). See also Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 431 F. 
2d 664,667 (2d Cir. 1970); 39 Stat. 756,768 (1916). 
77Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 96 (1960). The Court was concerned 
with section 23(1) of the 1939 Code which is the predecessor of section 167(a) of the 1954 Code. 
78Prior to the instant case, no court had determined that the requirements of both section 
167(a) and section 263(a) were fulfilled. 
79"Under section 161 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a generic section, a taxpayer 
is entitled to take various itemized deductions in reducing gross income to taxable income." 
Boone v. United States, 452 F.2d 417, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1973); see Road Mat., Inc. v. Com- 
missioner, 407 F.2d 1121, 1123 n.2 (4th Cir. 1969); Zeeman v. United States, 275 F. Supp. 
235,254 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), modified, 395 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1969). 
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acterizes the purpose of section 16 1 as "priority ordering";" the taxpayer, 
however, views it as a "housekeeping pro~ision"8~ with no independent 
substantive impact. In the instant case, the Court, faced for the first 
time with the necessity of interpreting section 161, agreed with the 
Commissioner. The regulations do not support this conclusion. Trea- 
sury Regulation 1.16 1 - 1 indicates the purpose of section 16 1 : "Double 
deductions are not permitted. Amounts deducted under one provision 
of the Internal Revenue Code cannot again be deducted under any other 
provision there~f . ' "~  No double deduction occurs if the taxpayer de- 
ducts its depreciation expense under section 167(a) and does not also 
capitalize under section 263(a). 
The brief legislative history of section 161 also shows no "priority 
ordering" purpose. The House and Senate both indicate: 
This section states the general rule that in computing taxable income 
there shall be allowed the deductions specifically provided in the other 
sections of Part VI relating to itemized deductions for individuals and 
corporations.83 
The Court stated that section 26 1 also acts to establish the priority of 
section 263 over 167, but the regulations do not support this conclusion 
either. Treasury Regulation 1.26 1-1 explains that: "[I] n computing 
taxable income, no deduction shall be allowed, except as otherwise ex- 
pressly provided in Chapter one of the Code. . . and the regulations 
thereunder."g4 The Commissioner conceded that depreciation is de- 
ductible under section 167(a) which is a "deduction expressly provided 
in Chapter one of the Code. "85 
The Court's technique of statutory construction is interesting but not 
helpful. In construing section 263(a) the Court rejected the plain mean- 
ing of "amount paid out" because of an "administrative understanding" 
derived from the regulations. On the other hand, in construing section 
161, the Court relied upon the wording of the statute as establishing a 
priority between sections. There is no support for this conclusion in the 
judicial, administrative, or legislative history of section 16 1. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
State and federal regulations require Idaho Power to use a method 
of accounting which capitalizes construction-related depreciation, and 
8OBrief for Appellant at 17-18; Reply Brief for Appellant at 5-6. 
81Brief for Appellee at 21 -22. 
82Treas. Reg. 5 1.161 -1 (1958). 
83H.R. REP. NO. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A 43 (1954); S. REP. NO. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d 
Sess., 195 (1954). 
84Treas. Reg. 5 1.261 -1 (1 958). 
8594 S. Ct. at 2762 n. 5. 
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the Court stated that this compulsory method may control a taxpayer's 
income tax consequences. The Court's decision in the instant case may 
allow a different result where taxpayers are free to choose an acceptable 
accounting method. For example, the Tax Court has recognized the 
"incremental overhead method "86 as clearly reflecting inc0me.8~ Under 
this method, if a taxpayer does not acquire special tools or machinery 
for use in self-construction activities, the taxpayer will not capitalize 
any depreciation on its books. Following the Court's interpretation of 
the role of section 446, a taxpayer's method of accounting which clearly 
reflects income would be "almost presumptively controlling of federal 
income tax consequences."~8 Under this rationale, a taxpayer would not 
capitalize any depreciation on its books or on its tax return. 
Nevertheless, some taxpayers that use the "incremental overhead 
method" will capitalize construction-related depreciation. For instance, 
the Idaho Power Company will probably purchase some additional 
equipment to use in its ongoing large-scale construction activities. On 
the other hand, much of the automotive equipment involved in the in- 
stant case might have been purchased for use in normal operations and 
used in construction only when it would otherwise be temporarily idle. 
The incremental overhead analysis is theoretically sounder than the 
Court's "benefit theory" in determining what self-construction expenses 
to capitalize. 
Federal Tax Liens - ASSIGNMENT OF ACCOUNTS -THE "NO PROP- 
ERTY" RULE UNDER THE 1966 FEDERAL TAX LIEN ACT AND ARTICLE 9 OF 
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE - Nevada Rock Q Sand Co. u. United 
States, 376 F. Supp. 161 (D. Nev. 1974). 
Coop Oil Products, Inc. (Coop) contracted with Nevada Rock & Sand 
Co. (NRSC) to perform certain construction work. In exchange for 
materials to complete its contract, Coop assigned to Witco Chemical 
Corporation (Witco) all monies due or to become due under the NRSC 
contract. Notice of the assignment was sent to N RSC which consented to 
make payment directly to Witco upon completion of Coop's perfor- 
mance. Witco failed to file notice of the Coop assignment as required by 
Nevada's Uniform Commercial Code. Subsequently, Coop completed 
performance of the NRSC contract, and approximately $10,000 became 
due and payable to Witco under the assignment. Prior to payment by 
NRSC of the amount due, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed 
delinquent taxes against Coop and, upon Coop's failure to pay the taxes, 
86See notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text. 
87Fort Howard Paper Co., 49 T.C. 275,285 (1967). 
8894 S. Ct. at 2766. 
